Traducianism, or
Creationism and the Origin of the Soul
by Jack Kettler
The Origin of the Soul
This study will focus on a
long standing theological debate. All I can
promise is, this study will not settle it.
With that said, it is certainly an issue that
should be studied. This study is in regards to
the origin of the human soul. Every Christian
believes that ultimately God is the creator of
the human soul. The area of disagreement is if
God supernaturally creates a new soul at
conception or is the human soul like the body
is generated from the parents.
In this study there will be
two brief definitions, followed by a positive
presentation for the idea that the soul like
the body is generated from the parents. And
then, a negative presentation that disagrees
and argues for the special creation of souls
at the time of conception. Both presentations
are from respected Reformed theologians. There
will be brief comments in closing and links
for further study.
Traducianism:
Traducianism is the teaching about the origin
of the soul, and how souls are propagated along with the bodies
by generation and are transmitted to the
children by the parents
Creationism:
Holds that God creates a new
soul supernaturally for each child conceived.
Lutheran theology usually
follows Traducianism. Roman Catholicism holds
to an immediate or creationism view of the
soul. Most Reformed and Presbyterians would be
in the creationism camp. There are exceptions
as will be seen from the positive article in
defense of Traducianism.
A Positive View of Traducianism
from a Reformed Theologian:
Theories of the Mode of Man’s
Creation
Three theories have been
formed of the mode of man’s creation: (1)
preexistence, (2) traducianism, and (3)
creationism.
Preexistence teaches that all
human souls were created in the beginning of
creation and before the creation of Adam. Each
individual human soul existed in an
antemundane state and is united with a human
body by ordinary generation. This theory found
some support in Plato’s speculations
respecting intuitive knowledge as the relics
of a preexistent state of the soul. Some of
the Jewish rabbinic schools adopted it, and
Origen endeavored, unsuccessfully, to give it
currency in the Christian church. Muller, in
his work entitled Sin, has revived it in a
modified form. He assumes, not an antetemporal
but a supratemporal state, in which the soul
existed and the origin of sin occurred. The
fall of man was not in a time before time, but
is timeless. This is virtually the same as
Kant’s conception of sin as a noumenon or
thing in itself, which is always time-less and
spaceless, in distinction from a phenomenon,
which always occurs in space and time.
Philippi (Doctrine 3.96) contends that
Mtiller’s view is virtually that of
preexistence. The propagation of the body
still leaves the ego preexistent.
Preexistence confines the
idea of species to the body. As this is
propagated, it is derived out of a common
physical nature. The body, consequently,
cannot be older than that physical human
nature which was created on the sixth day. The
spirit, on the other hand, was created prior
to the sixth day. The human spirit is purely
individual, like that of an angel. (See
supplement 4.1.1.)
Traducianism applies the idea
of species to both body and soul. Upon the
sixth day, God created two human individuals,
one male and one female, and in them also
created the specific psychico-physical nature
from which all the subsequent individuals of
the human family are procreated both
psychically and physically. Hase (Hutterus
redivivus 79) represents this theory as having
been adopted by Tertullian, Augustine, and the
elder Protestant divines, in the interest of
the stricter theory of original sin. Hagenbach
(55, 106) says that Tertullian was an earnest
advocate of traducianism; that Augustine and
Gregory the Great express themselves
doubtfully and “with reserve respecting
creationism”; and that “traducianism was
professed not only by heterodox writers like
Apollinaris, but by some orthodox theologians
like Gregory of Nyssa.” The writer in the
Middle Ages who maintains traducianism with
most decision is Bishop Odo of Cambray. His
treatise entitled Original Sin has received
little attention even from the historians of
doctrine, though it is marked by great
profundity and acumen.
Neander (1.615) describes the
traducianism of Tertullian in the following
terms:
It was his opinion, that our
first parent bore within him the undeveloped
germ of all mankind; that the soul of the
first man was the fountain head of all human
souls, and that all varieties of individual
human nature are but different modifications
of that one spiritual substance. Hence the
whole nature became corrupted in the original
father of the race, and sinfulness is
propagated at the same time with souls.
Although this mode of apprehending the matter,
in Tertullian, is connected with his sensuous
habits of conception, yet this is by no means
a necessary connection.
This last remark of Neander
is important. Bellarmine claims Augustine as a
creationist. Melanchthon and Klee reckon him
among traducian-ists. Gangauf says that he was
undecided. Delitzsch (Biblical Psychology 7)
asserts that he was wrestling with the subject
all his life. Luther, according to Delitzsch,
was at first inclined to traducianism, being
urged by Bugenhagen, but afterward
distinguished the creation and infusion of the
soul into the body as the second conception,
from the first bodily conception. Smith
(Theology, 168) asserts that “traducianism, on
the whole, has been the most widely spread
theory.” (See supplement 4.1.2.)
Turretin (9.12.6) remarks as
follows respecting the traducian view:
Some are of opinion that the
difficulties pertaining to the propagation of
original sin are best resolved by the doctrine
of the propagation of the soul (animae
traducem); a view held by not a few of the
fathers and to which Augustine frequently
seems to incline. And there is no doubt that
by this theory all the difficulty seems to be
removed; but since it does not accord with
Scripture or with sound reason and is exposed
to great difficulties, we do not think that
recourse should be had to it.
Maresius (De Marets), a
Calvinistic theologian whose opinions had
great weight, speaks as follows respecting
traducianism:
Although Augustine seems
sometimes to have been undecided (fluctuasse
aliquando) respecting the origin of the soul;
whether it is by immediate creation or by
propagation; he is fixed in the opinion that
original sin cannot be transmitted otherwise
than by propagation. And he is far more
inclined (hugepronior) to the last mentioned
doctrine, nay, to speak truly, he constantly
held it (constanler retinuit), in order to
save the justice of God; because it is
difficult to show the justice of infusing a
soul newly created and destitute of sin and
having no guilt of its own into a vitiated
body, by whose concupiscence and lust it is
stained and burdened, is exposed to many and
great evils in this life, and condemned to
everlasting punishment hereafter (Augustine,
Letter 28.137; Concerning the Soul; and
Jansenius, Concerning the State of Nature
1.15). This was the opinion of Apollinaris and
of nearly all the Western divines in Jerome’s
day and is defended by Mamixius, Sohnius, and
Combachius, truly great divines of our
communion; to which, if this were the place to
lay down the statements, I should not be much
disinclined (valde alienus). (Maresius,
Elenc-tic Theology, controversy 11)
Charnock (Discourse 1), after
remarking that wisdom and folly, virtue and
vice, and other accidents of the soul, are not
propagated, adds: “I do not dispute whether
the soul were generated or not. Suppose the
substance of it was generated by the parents,
yet those more excellent qualities were not
the result of them,” that is, of the parents.
Hooker (Ecclesiastical Polity 2.7), also,
speaks doubtfully: “Of some things, we may
very well retain an opinion that they are
probable and not unlikely to be true, as when
we hold that men have their souls rather by
creation, than propagation.” (See supplement
4.1.3.)
Creationism confines the idea
of species to the body. In this respect, it
agrees with the theory of preexistence, the
difference relating only to the time when the
soul is created. Creationism and preexistence
both alike maintain that the human soul is
individual only and never had a race-existence
in Adam. The creationist holds that God on the
sixth day created two human individuals, one
male and one female, and in them also created
the specific physical nature from which the
bodies of all the subsequent individuals were
procreated, the soul in each instance being a
new creation ex nihilo and infused into the
propagated body.
Hase (Hutterus redivivus, 79)
represents this view as having been favored by
Aristotle and adopted by Ambrose, Jerome,
Pelagius, Bel-larmine, and Calixtus. Hagenbach
(106) mentions as advocates of creationism
Lactantius, Hilary, and Jerome and remarks
(173) that this theory gained gradually upon
traducianism in the Middle Ages. John of
Damascus, Anselm, and Aquinas were
creationists. Heppe (Reformed Dogmatics, 12)
says that the Lutheran theologians almost
without exception adopted traducianism, while
the Reformed divines with very few exceptions
maintained creationism. Creationism has been
the most common view during the last two
centuries.
The choice must be made
between traducianism and creationism, since
the opinion that man as to his soul existed
before Adam has no support from revelation.
The Bible plainly teaches that Adam was the
first man; and that all finite spirits
existing before him were angels.
The question between the
traducianist and the creationist is this: When
God created the first two human individuals,
Adam and Eve, did he create in and with them
the invisible substance of all the succeeding
generations of men, both as to the soul and
body or only as to the body? Was the human
nature that was created in Adam and Eve simple
or complex? Was it physical solely, or was it
psychico-physical? Had the human nature in the
first pair two sides or only one? Was
provision made for propagating out of the
specific nature deposited in Adam individuals
who would be a union of body and soul or only
a mere body without a soul?6
The question, consequently,
between the parties involves the quantity of
being that was created on the sixth day, when
God is said to have created “man.” The
traducianist asserts that the entire invisible
substance of all the generations of mankind
was originated ex nihilo by that single act of
God mentioned in Gen. 1:27, by which he
created “man male and female.” The creationist
asserts that only a part of the invisible
substance of all the generations of mankind
was created by that act, namely, that of their
bodies; the invisible substance which
constitutes their souls being created
subsequently by as many distinct and separate
creative acts as there are individual souls.
(See supplement 4.1.4.)
Traducianism and creationism
agree with each other in respect to the most
difficult point in the problem, namely, a kind
of existence that is prior to the individual
existence. The creationist concedes that human
history does not start with the birth of the
individual man. He does not attempt to explain
original sin with no reference to Adam. He
maintains that the body and physical life of
the individual is not a creation ex nihilo in
each instance, but is derived from a common
physical nature that was originated on the
sixth day. In so doing, the creationist
concedes existence in Adam, to this extent.
But this race-mode of human existence, which
is prior to the individual mode, is the
principal difficulty in the problem, and in
conceding its reality as to the body the
creationist carries a common burden with the
traducianist. For it is as difficult to think
of an invisible existence of the human body in
Adam as to think of an invisible existence of
the human soul in him. In reality, it is even
more difficult; because the body of an
individual man, as we now know it, is visible
and tangible, while his soul is not. And an
invisible and intangible existence in Adam is
more conceivable than a visible and tangible.
In discussing either
traducianism or creationism, it is important
to define the idea of substance. The term, in
this connection, does not imply either
extension or figure. It is taken in its
etymological and metaphysical sense to denote
that entity which stands under phenomena and
is the base for them. As in theology, the
divine “substance” or nature is unextended and
formless yet a real entity, so in
anthropology, the human “substance” or nature
is without extension and figure yet is a
certain amount of real being with definite and
distinguishable properties (Shedd, Theological
Essays, 135-37).
So far as the mental or
psychical side of the human nature is
concerned, when it is said that the
“substance” of all individual souls was
created in Adam, of course nothing extended
and visible is implied. The substance in this
case is a spiritual, rational, and immortal
essence sim-ilar to the unextended essence of
God, in whose image it was made ex nihilo. And
so far as the physical and corporeal side of
man is concerned, the notion of “substance”
must be determined in the same manner. That
which stands under, that which is the substans
of the corporeal form and phenomena, is an
invisible principle that has no one of the
geometrical dimensions. Physical life, or the
animal soul, though not spiritual and immortal
like the rational soul, is nevertheless beyond
the reach of the five senses. It occupies no
space; it is not divisible by any material
instruments; it cannot be examined by the
microscope. In speaking therefore of the
primary created “substance” of the human body,
we must abstract from the notion everything
that implies figure and extension of parts:
“The things which are seen were not made of
things which do appear” (Heb. 11:3). The
visible body is constituted and built up by an
invisible vitality. Neither the cell nor
protoplasm nor the “ether” of Carus
(Physiology 1.13) nor any visible whatever can
be regarded as the substans of the body, as
the vital principle in its pri-mordial mode.
These are all of them extended and objects of
sensuous perception. They are the first form,
in which the primarily formless physical life
embodies itself. They each presuppose life as
an invisible. In thinking, therefore, of the
“substance” of all individual bodies as having
been created in Adam, we must not with
Tertullian and others think of microscopic
atoms, corpuscles, or protoplasm; but only of
the unseen principle of life itself, of which
these are the first visible organization.
Modern physiology (Haeckel,
Creation 1.297) describes the human egg as one
one-hundred-twentieth of an inch in diameter,
so that in a strong light it can just be
perceived as a small speck, by the naked eye.
This egg is a small globular bladder which
contains all the constituent parts of a simple
organic cell. These parts are (a) the mucous
cell substance or protoplasm, called the
“yolk”; (b) the nucleus or cell kernel, called
the “germinal vesicle,” which is surrounded by
the yolk (this nucleus is a clear glassy
globule of albumen about one six-hundredth of
an inch in diameter); and (c) the nucleolus,
the kernel speck or “germinal spot” (this is
enclosed and surrounded by the nucleus and is
the last phase of visible life under the
present microscope). This nucleolus is not the
invisible life itself in its first phase, as
immediately created ex nihilo. This “germinal
spot” is only the first hardening, as it were,
of the invisible into visibility. It is life
in this form; whereas, in the beginning, as
created in Adam, physical life was formless
and invisible. (1)
A Negative View of Traducianism
and a Positive view of the immediate special
creation of the human soul by a Reformed
Theologian:
Francis Turretin, the
Scholastic Reformer explains how the soul is
created.
Thirteenth Question: The
Origin of the Soul
Are souls created by God, or
are they propagated? We affirm the former and
deny the latter.
I. Although there are various
opinions of theologians and philosophers about
the origin of the soul, yet principally there
are two to which the others can be referred:
one asserting the creation, the other the
propagation, (traducem) of the soul. The
former holds all souls to have been
immediately created by God and by creating
infused; thus to be produced from nothing and
without any preexisting material. The latter,
however, maintains that souls are propagated.
The former is the opinion of almost all the
orthodox (with many of the fathers and
Scholastics). The latter is embraced by the
Lutherans. Tertullian was the author of
propagation (traducis) in Treatise on the
Soul (ANF 3:181-235), whom the Luciferians and
many of the Latins followed. Augustine
suspends his judgment (epechei)
on this point and, although often discussing
the question, still would not determine
anything about it (cf. Letter 166 “To Jerome”
[FC 30:6-31]; Letter 190 “To Optatus” [FC
30:271@881; The Retractions 1.1 [3] [FC
60:9@101). He testifies that “he still did not
know what was to be held” (ibid. 2.82 [561 [FC
60:244; PL 32.653]).
II. Those who believe in
propagation do not all think and speak
together. Some hold the soul to be propagated
from the semen of the parents and produced
from the potency of matter. But this is
rejected by most as less likely because if it
de, pended upon the virtue of the semen, it
would also be corporeal and subject to
corruption. Others hold it to be from the soul
of the father by propagation, yet in a manner
inscrutable and unknown to us (Martinius,
Miscellanearum Disputationum, Bk. 3,
Disp. 7 [1603], pp. 541-42). Others maintain
that the soul of the father procreates the
soul of the son from a certain spiritual and
incorporeal seed (as Timothy Bright). Finally,
others (the more common opinion) think the
soul is propagated by the soul, not by a
decision and partition of the paternal soul,
but in a spiritual manner, as light is kindled
by light (so Balthasar Meisner and most
Lutherans).
III. However, we endorse the
creation of the soul: (1) from the law of
creation; (2) from the testimony of Scripture;
(3) from reasons. (1) From the law of
creation, because the origin of our souls
ought to be the same as of the soul of Adam;
not only because we ought to bear his image (1
Cor. 15:47, 48), but also because his creation
(as the first individual of the whole species)
is an example of the formation of all men (as
the wedlock of our first parents was an
example for the rest). But the soul of Adam
was created immediately by God, since “he
breathed into his nostrils the breath of life”
(Gen. 2:7). Thus it is evident his soul was
not produced from potent material, but came to
him extrinsically through creation and was
infused into the body by the breath of God
himself. Nor ought it to be objected that we
cannot argue from Adam to ourselves because
the same thing might be said of the origin of
the body (which nevertheless is not the case,
since ours is generated from seed, while that
of Adam was created from the dust of the
earth). Although there may be a disparity by
reason of the efficient cause on account of
the diversity of the subjects (because as the
body is elementary and material, it can be
produced by man through generation; but the
soul, being immaterial and simple, cannot
spring from any other source than God by
creation), yet with respect to the material
cause a comparison may rightly be made. For as
the soul of Adam was created out of nothing,
so also are the souls of his posterity; and as
his body was formed of the dust of the earth,
so also our bodies from seed (which itself
also is earthly and material). Therefore the
mode of action with respect to Adam was also
singular, yet the nature of the thing is the
same in both cases. This is confirmed by the
production of Eve herself whose origin as to
the body is described as from a rib of Adam,
but of the soul no mention is made. Hence it
is plainly gathered that the origin of her
soul was not different from that of the soul
of Adam because otherwise Moses would not have
passed it over in silence (his purpose being
to describe the origin of all things). And
Adam himself would have mentioned this origin,
yea he would have declared it specially; he
would have said not only “this is bone of my
bones,” but “soul of my soul” (Gen. 2-23).
This would have set forth more strongly the
bond of wedlock, which should be not only in
the bodies, but also in the souls. Finally, if
Adam’s soul and ours had a different origin,
they could not be said to be of the same
species because his was from nothing. Ours,
however, would be from some preexisting
material wholly dissimilar.
IV. Second, from the
testimony of Scripture, in which God is spoken
of as the author and Creator of the soul in a
peculiar manner distinct from the body: “Then
shall the dust return to the earth as it was:
and the spirit shall return unto God who gave
it.” (Ecc. 12:7). Here a manifest difference
is marked between the origin and the
destruction of the body and the soul. The one
is said to return to the dust (whence it was
taken); the other, however, to return unto God
(who gave it). Therefore since the body
returns thither whence it had its origin, so
also the soul. This is more clearly confirmed
by the fact that God is said to “give the
spirit” (which cannot be understood of the
common giving by concourse with second
causes). For he also gives the body itself no
less than the soul because he is the first
cause of both (nor would he well be said by
antithesis [kat’antithesin] to have given the
spirit). Rather this is understood concerning
the proper and peculiar mode of origin (which
does not belong to the body). Nor ought it to
be said that this is to be referred to the
first creation of Adam. The scope, the words
and circumstances of the text prove that it
treats of the ordinary birth and destruction
of men. Accordingly their bodies return to the
dust (i.e., to the earth) whence they were
taken, while their spirits return unto God,
the judge, who gave them (either for glory or
for punishment).
V. “The word of the Lord,
which stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth
the foundation of the earth, and formeth the
spirit of man within him” (Zech. 12:1). Whence
a multiple argument is drawn for the creation
against the birth of the soul (psychogonian).
(1) He is said to form the spirit of man
within him; therefore he ought to produce it
immediately without the intervention of man.
(2) The formation of the spirit is joined with
the stretching out of the heavens and the
founding of the earth, as of the same order
and grade. Therefore since the former two are
works of omnipotence, made immediately by God
and without second causes, so the last ought
to be also. Nor can this be referred to the
mediate production of God because thus man
would be admitted to a participation of
causality, which the text does not allow
(since it asserts the production of the soul
as well as that of the heaven and earth to be
peculiar to God). However, this is falsely
restricted to the first production of man
since it ought to be extended equally to all.
Hence when it speaks of the production of the
soul elsewhere, the Scripture does not use the
singular (as if referring to the one soul of
Adam), but the plural (Ps. 33:15; Is. 57:16).
But man here is not taken individually for
Adam, but specifically for any man.
VI. “We have had fathers of
our flesh which corrected us, and we gave them
reverence: shall we not much rather be in
subjection unto the Father of spirits, and
live?” (Heb. 12:9). And Peter calls him in a
peculiar manner a “faithful Creator of souls”
(I Pet. 4:19). In Num. 16:22, God is called
‘the God of the spirits of all flesh.’ So too
Is. 57:16: “For I will not contend forever,
neither will I be always wroth: for the spirit
should fail before me, and the souls which I
have made.’ Now why should God be called “the
Father of spirits” in contradistinction to
“the fathers of the flesh” unless the origin
of each was different? And yet if souls are
propagated, the parents of the body and the
soul should be the same. Indeed “the flesh”
here cannot signify the old man or inborn
corruption because then it would not be
opposed to spirits (pneuniasi)
in the plural, but to spirit (pneumati)
in the singular. Rather it designates the
body, and they are called ‘fathers of the
flesh” who generate the flesh. So the word
“spirit” ought not to be referred to spiritual
gifts (which are not treated of here), but to
the other part of man opposed to the body. Nor
can the omission of the pronoun hamon
(with respect to the flesh) be a hindrance
because it is to be repeated apo
koinou (since he speaks about the same
according to the principles and origin of the
diverse parts). Hence in Num. 16:22, he is
called “the father of the spirits of all
flesh” (i.e., of all men). Again he cannot be
called “the Father of spirits” mediately, as
he is called “the father of the rain” (job
38:28) because he is its author (although not
immediately). Thus the antithesis between the
fathers of the flesh and the father of spirits
would not stand, and the force of the
apostolic exhortation to afford greater
obedience to God than to earthly fathers would
fall. Nor if the concourse of God is not
excluded from the production of the flesh
(although attributed to earthly fathers
because he is the universal first cause),
ought the concourse of man in the production
of the spirit to be excluded (because he is
the particular second cause).
VII. Third, the same thing is
proved by arguments from reason. The soul is
propagated by generation, either from both
parents or from one only; either as to its
totality or only as to a part. But neither can
be said. Not the former because thus two souls
would coalesce into one and be mingled. Not
the latter, for if from one (either the father
or the mother only) no reason can be given why
it should be propagated by the one rather than
by the other (since both parents are equally
the principle of generation). If the whole is
propagated, then the parents will be without
it and so will be deprived of life. If a part,
it will be divisible and consequently material
and mortal. Nor can it be reasonably replied
here that neither the whole soul nor a part of
it is propagated, but a certain substance born
of the soul and (as it were) an immortal seed
of the soul. For it is taken for granted that
there is a seed of the soul by which it either
generates or is generated; yet such a seed
cannot be granted (which does not fall from
the soul), and therefore proves it to be
material and divisible.
VIII. Again, all modes of
propagation are pressed by the most serious
difficulties; nor can they be admitted without
overthrowing the spirituality of the rational
soul. Not the first, which is held by those
who consider the soul to be produced from the
power of seed so that it is begotten with the
body. For the effect cannot (in the total
genus) be more noble than its cause; nor can
things corporeal and elementary be so elevated
as to produce a spiritual and rational thing.
If generated from seed, with the seed also it
will be corrupted. Men and brutes would have
the same origin and consequently the same
destruction. Not the second, which is held by
those who think the soul of the son to be from
that of the father in a manner inscrutable and
unknown by us. This entangles rather than
unfolds the matter. For the father produces
the son either from some preexistent matter or
from none; not from none because he would thus
create; not from some because either it would
be the corporeal substance of a seed (which
has just been proved to be false) or it would
be a certain spiritual substance of the soul
(which again cannot be said). This is true
because that spiritual substance is made
either from the whole soul of the father or
from a part only. Not from the whole because
thus the soul of the father would vanish and
be converted into that spiritual seed. Not
from a part because thus the soul of the
father would be divisible into parts, and
because that substance is corruptible and
perishes in the very instant the soul is
produced. But then it will no longer be a
spiritual or incorruptible substance. Thus it
would follow that there are two spirits in the
begotten man: the soul of the son and the
spiritual substance from which his soul was
produced. Besides, it is repugnant to the
nature of seed for it to remain after the
generation of the thing (because it ought to
be transmuted into what springs from the
seed).
IX. Not the third even though
it may seem preferable to others. They hold
that it is said to be propagated not by
alienation, but by communication (as when
light is kindled from light without any
division of the other). (1) But the
communication made of one and the same thing
and without any alienation occurs only in an
infinite and not in a finite essence (in which
the same numerical essence cannot be
communicated to another, but a similar only is
produced). (2) The soul of the son cannot be
produced from that of the father; neither
terminatively (because the terminus a quo
perishes, the terminus ad quem
being produced), nor decisively (because the
soul is without parts [ameristos]),
nor constitutively (because the soul of the
father is not a constitutive part of the soul
of the son). (3) The similitude of the light
does not apply. Besides the fact that the
flame and candle are corporeal substances
(while here the subject is a spiritual), it is
certain that light is produced from the
potency of the material. Nor can it be kindled
without a decision of fiery particles
transmitted from the lighted to the
extinguished torch (which cannot be said of
the soul).
X. Since, therefore, the
opinion of propagation labors under
inextricable difficulties, and no reason drawn
from any other source forces us to admit it,
we deservedly embrace the option of creation
as more consistent with Scripture and right
reason. This was also evidently the opinion of
most of the heathen philosophers themselves.
Hence the following expression of Zoroaster
according to Ficinum: “You must hasten to the
sunlight and to the father’s sunbeams: thence
a soul will be sent to you fully enslaved to
mind” (Chre
speudein se pros to phaos, kai pros patros
augas Enthen epemphthe soi psyche! polyn
hessamenif noun, Theologia
Platonica de immortalitate animorum 10
[1559], p. 160). Aristotle asserts that “the
mind or intellect, and that alone enters from
without, and is alone divine” (ton noun
thyrathen epeisienai kai theion einai monon,
Generation of Animals 2.3.27-28 [Loeb,
170-711). Cicero says, “No origin of the soul
can be found upon earth for there is nothing
in the soul mixed and concrete that seems to
be or born from the earth and made…. Thus
whatever that is which perceives, knows,
wishes and flourishes, is heavenly and divine
and on that account must necessarily be
eternal” (Tusculan
Disputations 1.66 [Loeb, 76-791).
XI. God is said to have
rested from all his work (Gen. 2:2), not by
retiring from the administration of things,
but by ceasing from the creation of new
species or individuals (which might be the
principles of new species). Thus he works even
now (Jn. 5:17) by administering the instituted
nature and multiplying whatever was; not,
however, by instituting what was not. Now the
souls which he creates every day are new
individuals of species already created.
XII. Although the soul is not
propagated, the divine blessing given at first
(Gen. 1:28) does not cease to exert its power
in the generation of men. For God always
cooperates with the generators and the
generation, not only by preserving man’s
prolific power, but also by infusing the soul
into the disposed body.
XIII. It is not necessary in
order that man may be said to generate man
that he should generate all natures or
essential parts of the compound. Otherwise,
the blessed virgin did not beget true God and
man. Rather it suffices that he prepares and
works up the material and renders it fit for
the introduction of form and attains the union
of the soul with the body (by which man is
constituted in his being as man and is made
such a physical compound). For generation
tends to the compound, not however to the
production of both parts. As man is said to
kill a man (who dissolves the union of the
soul with the body although he does not even
touch the soul), so man generates man because
he joins together those parts from which man
springs although not a soul-begetter
(psychogonos). Nor ought he who generates the
whole man to be forthwith the producer of the
whole of man.
XIV. Adam can be said to have
begotten man after his own image, although he
did not produce the soul. The cause of the
similitude is not the propagation of the soul,
but the production of bodies of the same
temperament with the parents. For from the
different temperament and humors of the body,
different propensities and affections are also
born in our souls.
XV. When souls are said to
have “gone out of the loins of Jacob” (Gen.
46:26), they are not understood properly, but
synecdochically for the “persons” (a most
usual manner of expression with the
Scriptures). Moreover, there was no need that
Jacob should contribute anything to the
production of these souls. It suffices that he
concurred to their conjunction or subsistence
in the body mediately or immediately.
Therefore they are said to have gone out, not
as to being or substance simply, but as to
subsistence in the body and union with it.
XVI. Although Christ was no
less in Abraham (according to the flesh) than
Levi (who was tithed in his loins, Heb.
7:9-10*), it does not follow that Levi was in
him according to his soul (so that the soul of
Levi was propagated and that a distinction may
be preserved). Rather Levi (with respect to
person) was in Abraham according to seminal
mode and the natural powers of the father and
mother (from whom he was to be born). But
Christ was in him only as to the human nature
with regard to the mother; not, however, as to
his divine nature and person. Thus his person
could not be tithed; but as a superior he
tithed Abraham and blessed him in Melchizedek
(his type), not as man, but as the Mediator,
God-man (theanthropos),
performing a kingly and priestly office.
XVII. The propagation of
original sin ought not to cause a denial of
the creation of souls and the adoption of
propagation because it can be sufficiently
saved without this hypothesis (as will be
demonstrated in its place). Although the soul
is not materially from Adam (as to substance),
yet it is originally from him as to
subsistence. And as man is rightly said to
beget man (although he does not beget the
soul), so an impure progenerates an impure,
especially (the just judgment of God
intervening) that by which it was established
that what he had bestowed upon the first man,
he should at the same time have and lose for
himself as well as his posterity. Now although
it is curious to inquire and rash to define
why God infuses a soul tainted with sin and
joins it to an impure body, it is certainly
evident that God did not will (on account of
the sin of man) to abolish the first sanction
concerning the propagation of the human race
by generation. Thus the order of the universe
and the conservation of human nature demanded
it. (2)
In closing:
I would have to say if pinned
down for an answer that I would be in the
creationism camp. But I would also say that I
am unsettled to a degree. Both positions have
seemingly strong arguments as well as
problematic issues. With modern theologians
such as Gordon H. Clark and Jay Adams holding
to Traducianism, gives me pause before
dismissing it. See links below for their
articles.
Critics of Traducianism will
say holding this position will create a
problem for holding to the doctrine of
“original sin.” Possibly, but in the case of
Gordon Clark who was a rigid logician, it
makes me think that this objection does not
hold up. If Clark thought that Traducianism
necessitated abandoning “original sin,” he
would never have embraced it. If you have
familiarity with Clark’s writings, you will
understand the point I am making.
This is an issue that
probably will not be solved this side of
heaven. Next, a couple of problems associated
with each position are noted.
A problem with Traducianism
is that it is unclear how an incorporeal soul
can be produced from another soul.
A weakness of the
Creationists view is that God is repeatedly
creating new souls. For example, in the book
of Genesis 2:2-3, it seems clear that God is
finished with creation.
The goal of this study is to
help us magnify the Lord God for his marvelous
grace that made us children of God through no
merit of our own. It is my prayer that this
goal has been attained.
“But God commendeth his love
toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners,
Christ died for us.” (Romans 5:8)
“Study to shew thyself approved unto God, a
workman that needeth not to be ashamed,
rightly dividing the word of truth.” (2
Timothy 2:15)
Notes:
1.William
G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology,
(Phillipsburg, N.J., Presbyterian and Reformed
Publishing Company, Third addition: 1 vol.
edition, 2003), pp. 430-434.
2.Francis
Turretin. Institutes of Elenctic Theology,
vol 1, (Phillipsburg, N.J., Presbyterian and
Reformed Publishing Company, 1992), pp.
477-482.
“To God only wise, be glory through Jesus
Christ forever. Amen.” (Romans 16:27) and
“heirs according to the promise.” (Galatians
3:28, 29)
Mr. Kettler has previously
published articles in the Chalcedon Report
and Contra Mundum. He and his wife
Marea attend the Westminster, CO, RPCNA
Church. Mr. Kettler is the author of the book
defending the Reformed Faith against attacks,
titled: The Religion That Started in a
Hat. Available at:
www.TheReligionThatStartedInAHat.com
For more study:
* For a great source of
theological definitions go to Rebecca writes
at Rebecca Writes:
http://www.rebecca-writes.com/theological-terms-in-ao/
** CARM theological
dictionary
https://www.studylight.org/dictionaries/ctd.html
Traducianism by Gordon H. Clark
http://www.trinityfoundation.org/PDF/The%20Trinity%20Review%200026a%20Traducianism.pdf
Traducianism by Jay Adams
http://www.nouthetic.org/blog/?p=210